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Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A
Question of Judicial Responsibility
By
ROGER J. TRAYNOR*
There is an alluring ring of the future in a term like prospective
overruling of judicial decisions. At the same time its kinship to
statutes deceptively fosters the impression that decisions can bask in
the ancient history of the principle originating in the Roman law that
statutes operate prospectively only. In 1250 Bracton declared that
principle anew. Eventually Coke incorporated it into the English
common law,' and by the seventeenth century it was an accepted rule
of statutory construction in common law courts that statutes operate
only prospectively. The rule bespoke the view of lawyers and judges
that retroactive operation would be inherently unfair. By the time of
Blackstone that view had evolved into the principle that statutes
operate prospectively by their very nature. A statute could not be
effective before it was enacted; ergo, it could not apply to events that
preceded its enactment.
These views crossed the Atlantic Ocean and gained
constitutional authority in the ex post facto clause and the
impairment of contracts clause of the United States Constitution.
The due process clause also served to militate against retroactive
statutes that afforded no opportunity for notice or fair hearing.2
' This article was first published in 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533 (1977). For citation
purposes, please refer to the original source of the material.
*A.B. 1923, Ph.D. & J.D. 1927, University of California. Justice of the California
Supreme Court, 1940-64. Chief Justice of California, 1964-70. Sir Arthur Goodhart
Professor of Legal Science, University of Cambridge, England, 1974-75. Honorary
Professor of Legal Ethics, University of Birmingham, England, 1974-75. Roger J. Traynor
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
This article was originally presented as a lecture in 1975 at the University of
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1. See Schulman, Retroactive Legislation, in 7 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 356 (1937); Smead,
The Rule Againist Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L.
REv. 775 (1936).
2. Thus, a statute that reduced the period of adverse possession from twenty years to
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Since there are no comparable constitutional restrictions in
England, Parliament is free to make or alter the law retroactively,
even to the extent of depriving a successful party to litigation of the
fruits of his victory. Thus, in Burmah Oil Co. v. Lord Advocate3 the
plaintiff's property near Rangoon was destroyed under British
military orders the day before Japanese authorities occupied
Rangoon. After the war the plaintiff sought compensation under the
common law, since legislation providing compensation for war
damage did not apply to the case. The House of Lords upheld the
plaintiff's claim. Shortly thereafter an Act of Parliament abolished
retroactively the common law right of compensation declared by the
House of Lords and nullified the plaintiff's judgment.4 Perhaps this
case will be viewed as an extraordinary instance of the sovereignty of
Parliament and not as a precedent to be invoked by any transient
parliamentary majority for new jolts to the principle of judicial
independence. Meanwhile, we can only rely on Parliament's own
respect for judicial independence and its own self-restraint to confine
such jolts to the most extraordinary situations. Given such restraint
the singular pouring of Burmah Oil on judicial waterways may
engender not trouble but reassurance, as Professor Arthur Goodhart
maintains, of the strength of the fluid English constitution:
The English doctrine that the general principles of the common law
are supreme but that in certain circumstances exceptions can be
made to them, has enabled the constitution to continue with only
one violent break for over eight hundred years.
5
Although statutes normally operate prospectively only, judicial
decisions normally operate retroactively as well as prospectively. The
mundane explanation is that a judicial decision, relating to events that
have already occurred, naturally looks backward. That common
sense must be taken with the essential grain of salt. A judge is bound
to make constant use of the eyes at the back of his head, but he has
six after a six-year period had already run against the owner was held void as taking of
property without due process of law. Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139 (1913).
In a later case the Court held that retroactive overruling in combination with the running
of the statute of limitations denied due process of law. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings
Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
The courts, however, did not regard all retroactive statutes as evil. They found some,
such as curative statutes, necessary or desirable. See Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxation,
48 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1935); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
Nevertheless, such examples of retroactivity are still exceptions to the rule of prospective
operation for statutes. For the most part they dare not look back in the United States lest
they turn into a pillar of unconstitutionality.
3. [1965] A.C. 75.
4. War Damages Act of 1965.
5. Goodhart, The Burmah Oil Case and War Damage Act 1965, 82 L.Q. REV. 97
(1966).
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also a responsibility to keep a weather eye forward. I take my stand
with this modern view the better to emphasize the need for occasional
exceptions to the normally retroactive operation of judicial decisions.
For all too many generations we justified mechanical retroactivity by
the prim lore descended to us through Blackstone that judges do no
more than discover the law that marvelously has always existed,
awaiting only the judicial pen that would find the right words for all to
heed. Once suitably bundled up it was automatically retroactive,
given the premise that it had been there all along in the bushes at the
bottom of the garden. The devotees of the discovery theory
majestically dispelled the fractious problem of the overruled decision.
The overruling decision simply displaced it all the way back in time so
that it never had a life it could call its own. Under the spell of such
moonspinning, American courts soon upheld a retroactive operation
of decisions that they would have invalidated in statutes as contrary to
the ex post facto clause, the impairment of contracts clause, or the
due process clause of the Constitution.
6
Like many another myth,7 the myth that judges discovered rather
than created law, surviving well into the twentieth century,
engendered rituals that have outlived it. The ritual of mechanical
retroactivity of judicial decision came to have its own rationalizations,
affording no leeway for exceptions. The conviction that a new
judicial rule is more just than an old one is still likely to carry the
topheavy inference that such a rule achieves maximum justice by
retroactive application. There are no questions asked about
countervailing injustice to those who have relied on the old rule.
6. See, e.g., Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444,450-51 (1924); Frank v. Mangum,
237 U.S. 309 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 (1913). See also Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385,389 (1798).
7. See Address by Lord Diplock, Presidential Address, The Holdsworth Club, 1965.
There Lord Diplock, speaking on "The Courts as Legislators," said, "But judge-made law,
as I have pointed out, is in theory retrospective. A precedent which reverses or modifies a
previous precedent is applicable to all such cases which are tried subsequently even
though they arise out of acts done before the new precedent was laid down. This is unjust,
and because it is unjust it is itself a factor which makes the courts more hesitant than they
would otherwise be to correct previous errors or to adapt an established rule of conduct to
changed conditions. And yet the rule that a new precedent applies to acts done before it
was laid down is not an essential feature of the judicial process. It is a consequence of a
legal fiction that the Courts merely expound the law as it has always been. The time has
come, I suggest, to reflect whether we should discard this fiction." See also Lord Reid, The
Judge As Lawmaker, 12 J. Soc'Y PUB. TEACHERS L. (New Series) 22 (1972). There the
author said, "There was a time when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that judges
make law-they only declare it. Those with a taste for fairy tales seem to have thought
that in some Aladdin's Cave there is hidden the Common Law in all its splendour and that
on a judge's appointment there descends on him knowledge of the magic words Open
Sesame .... But we do not believe in fairy tales any more." See generally A. CROSS,
PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1968).
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Neither is there any eye-opening comparison with a new statute,
which may also be superior in justice to a judicial rule that it
displaces, but which will ordinarily be construed to have prospective
operation only.
We might well quit ourselves of superficial rationalization for
retroactive operation of judicial rules, admitting of no exceptions, for
we can better justify their retroactive operation, admitting of
reasonable exceptions, by the very reasoning that justified stare
decisis as a prevailing principle, admitting of reasonable exceptions.
A persuasive justification of the retroactive operation of judicial
decisions and of the Blackstone conception, without its mythical
trappings, has been advanced by Professor Paul Mishkin:
Actually, while the Blackstonian conception is not entirely valid,
neither is it wholly wrong. For it is certainly true that courts in
general handle the vast bulk of cases by application of preexisting
law; indeed even when "new law" must be made, it is often in fact a
matter of the court articulating particular clear implications of
values so generally shared in the society that the process might well
be characterized as declaring a preexisting law. Moreover, this must
inevitably be so. For it is the basic role of courts to decide disputes
after they have arisen. That function requires that judicial
decisions operate (at least ordinarily) with retroactive effect. In
turn, unless those decisions (at least ordinarily) reflect preexisting
rules or values, such retroactivity would be intolerable.
8
Stare decisis signifies the basic characteristic of the judicial
process that differentiates it from the legislative process.9 In the
legislative process there is neither beginning nor end. It is an endless
free-wheeling experiment, without institutional restraints, that may
have rational origins and procedures and goals or that may lack them.
In contrast, a judge invariably takes precedent as his starting point; he
8. Mishkin, The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law,
79 HARV. L. REv. 56, 60 (1965). One writer stated that "[t]o serve its highest aims, a legal
system must have the stability and predictability essential to security, order, and
evenhanded justice. If it is to continue even for generations and the more clearly if it is to
survive still onger, it must also have flexibility to change and ability to grow with the
institutions and society it serves-the capacity, in short, to renew itself." Preface to R.
KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE at v (1969). See also Freeman, Standards of
Adjudication, Judicial Law-Making and Prospective Overruling, 26 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 166, 179 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Freeman]. Another author has said: "The
art of free society consists first in the maintenance of the symbolic code; and secondly in
fearlessness of revision to secure that the code serves those purposes which satisfy an
enlightened reason. Those societies which cannot combine reverence to their symbols with
freedom of revision, must ultimately decay either from anarchy, or from the slow atrophy
of a life stifled by useless shadows." A. WHITEHEAD, SYMBOLISM: ITS MEANING AND
EFFEcr 88 (1927).
9. See the excellent exposition of the characteristics that distinguish judges from
legislators in Freeman, supra note 8, at 174-80.
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is constrained to arrive at a decision in the context of ancestral
judicial experience: the given decisions or, lacking these, the given
clues. Even if his search of the past yields nothing, so that he
confronts a truly unprecedented case, he still arrives at a decision in
the context of judicial reasoning with recognizable ties to the past; by
its kinship thereto it not only establishes the unprecedented case as a
precedent for the future, but integrates it into the often rewoven but
always unbroken line with the past.
A judge is constrained not only to heed the relevant judicial past
in arriving at a decision, but also to arrive at it within as straight and
narrow a path as possible. Unlike a legislator, he cannot undertake
broad investigations beyond the case before him. He is confined by
the record in the case, which in turn is confined to legally relevant
material, limited by evidentiary rules. So it happens that even a
decision of far-reaching importance concludes with the words: "We
hold today only that .... We do not reach the question whether .... "
The very circumspection of the judicial process enhances the
significance of a decision. No one is apt to take it lightly, knowing
how intently a judge must hew to the record before him. It offers no
reforestation or defoliation program, but what it decides about a
single tree may give new perspective to the forest. Indeed, one might
describe the ideal, the well-tempered decision as one that affords such
perspective. It is not laden with ancient phrases harking backward;
neither is it freighted with seven-league words for an ambitious march
on the future. The well-tempered decision knows how to take
graceful leave of a dark landmark that is no longer on its mark, but
takes care to refrain from all-purpose guidance for all that lies ahead.
It knows how to keep its place in time.10
Such a decision affords a court a modicum of flexibility within its
severe constraints. Insofar as a decision remains uncommitted to
drastic implications, a court gains time to inform itself further through
succeeding cases. It is then better situated to retreat or advance with
a minimum of shock to those who act in reliance upon judicial
decisions. The greatest judges of the common law have proceeded in
this way, moving not by fits and starts, but at the pace of a tortoise
that explores every inch of the way, steadily making advances though
it carries the past on its back. The slow motion of the judicial process,
perhaps too summarily summarized as stare decisis, not only benefits
the long-range evolution of the law, but also affords substantial
protection against arbitrary judicial decision. Moreover, the
legislature is always free to displace judicial rules with its own
statutes.
10. See generally Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of
the Law, 53 CAL L. REV. 151,158-59 (1965).
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Even when relevant precedents emerge, a judge can take hope
prematurely. No sooner does one line of precedent become clear
enough to command attention than another may appear that seems
equally impressive. In a mass of uncertainty lies a variety of
precedents, and a judge makes selection upon selection before
reaching his decision. The precedents are writ in type that moves like
water and they are not holy writ.
Though there is not always so baffling a choice to make, the
manifold problem of precedent engenders other difficulties. A judge
coming upon a precedent that he might not himself have established
will ordinarily feel impelled to follow it to maintain the stability in the
law that has value per se. Better the settled precedents that have
proved reasonably acceptable and are reasonably in tune with the
times than endless reexaminations that create uncertainty without
ensuring improvement. The serviceable consistency of stare decisis
rightly discourages displacement of precedent, absent overwhelming
countervailing considerations. It also rightly discourages specious
distinctions that confuse more than they clarify.
There are, of course, precedents originally so unsatisfactory or
grown so unsatisfactory with time as to deserve liquidation.
Unfortunately a court often lacks the forthrightness to bring about
their demise. Instead it may pursue the unhappy alternatives of
keeping them alive and kicking irrationally or of sustaining them half
alive. It may blindly follow precedent only because it lacks the wit or
the will or the courage to spell out why the precedent no longer
deserves to be followed. It may deem itself helpless to overrule its
precedents, as the Court of Appeal apparently still does in view of
Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co." despite Lord Denning's efforts to
escape the bonds of that case. La Rochefoucauld reminds us that
"[w]hen laziness and timidity yoke us to our duties, we often give
virtue the credit for it."'12 In Caerphilly Concrete Products Ltd. v.
Owen13 a sense of helplessness may have been the yoke to duty. A
lease for a term of five years contained a clause giving the tenant a
right to another lease for a further term of five years "at the same
rent and containing the like covenants and provisos as are herein
contained (including an option to renew such lease for the further
term of five years at the expiration thereof) .... ,,14 In concluding
reluctantly that this clause made the lease perpetually renewable,
Lord Justice Sachs declared:
Not even the most impeccable conveyancing logic, however neatly
11. [1944] 1 K.B. 718.
12. LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS, No. 169 at 64 (L. Kronenberger transl. 1959).
13. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 372 (C.A.).
14. Id. at 375.
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expressed, can convince me that in the instant case it was the
mutual intention of the parties that the lease should be perpetually
renewable.... It is difficult indeed... to think that two business
men would be talking in terms of five years if both-or indeed
either-of them truly meant that a lease should be granted which
went on ad infinitum.
An examination of the relevant decisions discloses an area of law in
which the courts have manoeuvred themselves into an unhappy
position.... [B]y strict adherence to precedent relating to the
phrase 'including the present covenant' when following a covenant
conferring a right to a renewal on the like covenants and provisos
as are contained in the first lease, they appear to have bound
themselves to hold that the use of a certain set of words... causes
the lease to be perpetually renewable, even when no layman...
would dream of granting such a lease and, if aware of the technical
meaning of the particular phraseology, would almost certainly be
aghast at its devastating effect and refuse to sign. One reason for
the courts so binding themselves is said to be that the formula is
one of the effect of which is well known to trained conveyancers,
and that this is advantageous, however much of a trap it may
constitute for others.
On the issue of the intentions of the parties the law had become the
prisoner of the machinery.15
Reasonable expectations of the parties would not be upset by
overruling such a case. It is difficult to believe that a "trained" and
reputable conveyancer would rely on precedents to create such a trap
for an unsuspecting lessor. Res judicata would sustain the old
interpretation of the clause in leases that had already been finally
litigated, since final judgments in such cases would be immune from
collateral attack.
Such dogmatic adherence to the past perpetuates bad law. It is
hardly the lesser of two evils to postpone the making of good law by
crowding an unfortunate precedent with distinctions instead of
retiring it forthwith. It then lingers on, leaving counsel puzzled as to
what strange complications will next attend its lingering illness. On
the unpredictable retirement date a formal overruling is too often
attended by a cavalier pronouncement that the precedent must be
deemed to have revealed itself as superannuated in the lengthening
shadows of the newcomers. Such a pronouncement comes late to
those who had long suspected it was overdue but had still to reckon
with the possibility that it might not materialize.
Courts are often so dismayed by the extent of an unnecessary evil
as to retreat into defeatism. The case law has come to such a state,
they are wont to say, that only the legislature can set things aright.
Ironically, judges themselves are all too ready to seize on this
15. Id. at 375-77.
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rationalization to shift to others the responsibility of overruling
judge-made bad law. This is evasion, not mere abstentious avoidance
of judicial responsibility. The time is ripe for redress and no one can
undertake it more appropriately than the judges themselves. Their
inaction speaks louder than words to perpetuate error and confusion.
Always there is the danger that an effort to induce a court to
abandon or revise an outmoded common law rule may result only in
resanctifying it. If the court adheres to stare decisis, as it is wont to do,
with an aloof statement that the question is one for the legislature-
although it is one created by judicial decision-it creates not only a
new halo for the old rule, but a precedent that it is not within the
province of the court to make a change. Thus doubly haloed the rule
becomes judicially untouchable.
A bad precedent is doubly evil because it has not only inflicted
hardship but threatens to continue doing so. When a judge resolves
at last to overrule it, however, he confronts the immediate problem of
how much reliance the precedent engendered. Reliance in one case
of enormous repercussions? Reliance in many cases of small but
cumulatively strong repercussions? No serious reliance at all in view
of the mocking distinctions attending a precedent? A judge is
mindful that an overruling is normally retroactive but also mindful of
the traditional antipathy toward retroactive law that springs from its
recurring association with injustice. He must reckon with the
possibility that a retroactive overruling could entail substantial
hardship. He may nevertheless be impelled to make such an
overruling if the hardships it would impose upon those who have
relied upon the precedent appear not so great as the hardships that
would inure to those who would remain saddled with a bad
precedent. An immediate consideration will be that statutes of
limitations, by putting an end to old causes of action, markedly cut
down the number of possible hardship cases.
No modern judge adheres to precedent ritualistically, but in the
main he honors it for good reason, for the endlessly useful solutions it
makes available to him by way of example as he confronts each
puzzle to which something new has been added. If the puzzle still
proves intractable to solution in familiar ways, a judge is still likely to
do honor to the precedent in the breach, setting forth clearly the
disparity between the square facts before him and the often
well-rounded precedents that now fail to match them. He has also the
responsibility of justifying the new precedent he has evolved not
merely as the dispossessor of the old, but as the best of all possible
replacements.
He is hardly eager to take on so demanding a responsibility if he
can do otherwise. He knows that a new rule must be supported by
the full disclosure in his opinion of all aspects of the problem and of
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
the data pertinent to its solution. Thereafter the opinion must pass
muster with scholars and practitioners on the alert to note any
misunderstanding of the problem, any error in reasoning, any
irrelevance in data, any oversight of relevant data, any premature
cartography beyond the problem in hand. Every opinion is thus
subject to approval.
Moreover, however moribund he finds a precedent, he may still
be deterred from displacing it by another restraint of judicial office,
the tradition that the function of a court is not itself to innovate
changes but only to keep the law responsive to significant changes in
the customs of the community. Normally the judge will abide by the
tenet that the law must lag a respectful pace back of popular mores,
not only to insure its own acceptance but also to delay legal
formalization of community values until they have become seasoned.
That tradition makes good sense so long as the lag does not
deteriorate into a lapse.
When a judge does overrule a precedent, it matters little whether
it related only to the common law or to the interpretation of a
constitution or statute. Often a statute itself has codified rules of
common law, and in any event a judge arrives at his decision via
reasoning native to the common law. Hence the context of the case
ordinarily does not affect the prevailing rule that an overruling
decision operates retroactively.
It is my opinion that however sound this prevailing rule may be
in the main, it can on occasion unduly restrict the development of the
law. A court usually will not overrule a precedent even if it is
convinced that the precedent is unsound, when the hardship caused
by a retroactive change would not be offset by its benefits. The
technique of prospective overruling enables courts to solve this
dilemma by changing bad law without upsetting the reasonable
expectations of those who relied on it.16 Only occasionally will there
16. For a detailed history of the origin and development of the idea of prospective
overruling, see Levy, Realist Jurisprudence And Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 17-25 (1965). See also B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS,
147-49 (1921); R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE (1969); Address by Justice
Cardozo. New York State Bar Association, Jan. 22, 1932, in 55 N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N REP. 263
(1932); Bender, The Retroactive Effect of An Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v.
Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 650 (1962); Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law:
Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965); Freeman, supra note 8; Friedland,
Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking, 24 U. TORONTO L.J. 170 (1974);
Friedmann, Limits of Judicial Lawmaking And Prospective Overruling, 29 MODERN L.
REV. 593 (1966); Haddad, "Retroactivity Should be Rethought". A Call For The End Of
The Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 417 (1969); Meador, Habeas Corpus And
The "Retroactivity" Illusion, 50 VA. L. REV. 1115 (1964); Mishkin, The High Court, The
Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); Schaefer,
The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631
April 1999] PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING
be cases that clearly demand this technique.1 7 In the hands of skilled
judicial craftsmen, acting under well-reasoned guidelines, it can be an
instrument of justice that fosters public respect for the law.18
Although the technique is frequently invoked in overruling
precedents, it can serve in any case in which new rules are announced.
Amid the current lively interest in the prospective operation of
an overruling decision, particularly in the United States, it is worth
recalling various decisions specifying such operation, covering a long
space of time. They have a common objective, to rid the law of an
unsound rule and at the same time preclude undue hardship to a
party that has justifiably relied on it. Reliance plays its heaviest role
in such areas as property, contracts, and taxation, where lawyers
advise clients extensively in their planning on the basis of existing
precedents.
In most of the decisions I shall now review briefly, overruling was
the rational judgment and prospective overruling was essential to
preclude the injustice that retroactive application of the new rule
would have entailed. Thus the early municipal bond cases, to prevent
gross injustice, precluded retroactive application of new rules. In 1863
the United States Supreme Court in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque'9
(1967); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor
Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (1966); Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling
Decisions, 35 U. ILL. L. REv. 121 (1940); Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive
Application in The Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application].
17. The "element of surprise will not realistically be an operative factor in a great
many cases because the parties will have acted without any knowledge at all of what the
governing law was; whatever law is finally held to govern their conduct, whether it be the
old rule or the new rule, will be a new rule to them." Prospective Overruling and
Retroactive Application, supra note 16, at 945. I believe that most judges would agree with
Cardozo: "My impression is that the instances of honest reliance and genuine
disappointment are rarer than they are commonly supposed to be by those who exalt the
virtues of stability and certainty." Address by Justice Cardozo, New York State Bar
Association, Jan. 22, 1932, in 55 N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N REP. 295 (1932).
18. But see Freeman, supra note 8, at 207: "It has been part of my thesis that rules
contain within themselves social objectives and policy choices, and that judicial
law-making which works within this ambit is legitimate. Prospective overruling does not
and, in spite of superficial attractions, it is a technique which does not commend itself." Sir
Leslie Scarman, then chairman of the English Law Commission and now a member of the
Court of Appeal, commented: "I have difficulty in understanding the bifurcation of the
judicial process... which all of us know has been achieving a measure of employment in
various states of the United States of America. I find it difficult to under stand how a
judge can say a case will be decided in this way for the parties in front of him but to give
notice that in the future it will be decided in a different way for different parties who may
come later. This seems, to my mind, a straining or distortion of the judicial process which
we should avoid if we can ..... Scarman, Law Reform by Legislative Techniques, 32 SASK.
L. REV. 217,219-29 (1967).
19. 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 175 (1863). See Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 4
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refused to give retroactive effect to a decision of the Supreme Court
of Iowa, holding certain municipal bonds invalid and noting that
plaintiffs had purchased such bonds in reliance on an earlier decision
of that court holding them valid.20
Other early cases limiting new rules to prospective application in
the interest of justice also involved property rights. Thus, in 1892 the
Alabama Supreme Court, ruling in Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co.21 on
the vesting of legal title to property, took care to give the rule
prospective application only. Similarly the North Carolina Supreme
Court in 1906 approved the prospective application for decisions
overruling settled rules of property or contract rights, on the ground
that the "highest principles of justice" militate against divestment of
rights acquired in reliance on prior law.22
The legislative divorce cases afford another early exception to
the retroactive application of a court decision. Thus the Supreme
Court of Ohio, in holding legislative divorces invalid, refused to apply
its decision retroactively to invalidate prior legislative divorces that
had been granted over a period of more than forty years.23 The court
noted that retroactive application would have invalidated numerous
second marriages and rendered illegitimate many children born of
such marriages. 24
The leading case of Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil &
Refining Co.25 involved a Montana statute that granted rate-fixing
authority to the state railroad commission. The Montana Supreme
Court had authorized a right of reparation to shippers or carriers
HARV. L. REV. 311 (1891).
20. In 1879, the United States Supreme Court explicitly applied prospectively a rule
invalidating municipal bonds in a situation similar to Gelpcke: "After a statute has been
settled by judicial construction, the construction becomes, so far as contract rights
acquired under it are concerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a
change of decision is, to all intents and purposes, the same in its effect on contracts as an
amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment." Douglass v. County of Pike,
101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879). From this language state courts and federal courts subsequently
carved out a "contract right" or "property right" to preclude retroactivity. The objective
was to foster stability in commercial transactions.
21. 95 Ala. 551,10 So. 635 (1892).
22 See Hill v. Atlantic & N.C.R.R., 143 N.C. 539, 55 S.E. 854 (1906). Sometimes a
court tolerates indefinitely the vicious circle of a defective old rule and reliance thereon,
even though the old rule may have been unsound from its inception. See my concurring
opinion in Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944). See also Armstrong,
"Prospective" Application of Changes in Community Property Control-Rule of Property
or Constitutional Necessity?, 33 CAL. L. REv. 476 (1945); Comment, Community and
Separate Property: Constitutionality of Legislation Decreasing Husband's Power of Control
Over Property Already Acquired, 27 CAL. L. REV. 49 (1948).
23. Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445,49 Am. Dec. 471 (1848).
24. Id. at 448-49,49 Am. Dec. at 473-74.
25. 91 Mont. 216,7 P.2d 927, affd, 287 U.S. 353 (1952).
April 19991 PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING
unreasonably burdened by a rate modification. Sunburst had
accordingly sued Great Northern for reparation. Then the Montana
Supreme Court, overruling its earlier decision, held that the right of
reparation did not exist. Nonetheless it permitted Sunburst to
recover because the old rule had been "the governing principle for
shippers and carriers who, during the period of its reign, had acted on
the faith of it .... ,,26 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether Great Northern had been denied due
process and held that no federal question was raised by the
prospective overruling.
The significance of reliance was also dominant in Hare v. General
Contract Purchasing Corp.27 The Supreme Court of Arkansas had
held in several cases that a form of instalment contract did not violate
a prohibition in the Arkansas Constitution of interest rates in excess
of 10 percent. When the same form of contract was again before the
court in the Hare case, the court found that the contract was usurious
but applied the new rule prospectively because of the many contracts
that had been entered into in reliance on the court's earlier decisions.
A salient example of the prospective application of an overruling
decision is the case of Brown v. Board of Education28 holding that the
state action involved in segregated schools violated the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution. Normally, state
action that has been declared unconstitutional would be promptly
terminated. Given the massive adjustment necessitated by the
decision, however, the United States Supreme Court framed its
decision in terms of the now famous equitable injunction calling for
compliance "with all deliberate speed," a phrase that enabled the
court to have its new rule take effect in slow motion.
Eight years went by. Then the Court, in the 1963 case of Watson
v. City of Memphis, 29 held that enough time for deliberate speed had
elapsed and that desegregation must now proceed in earnest.
The extraordinary technique of the Brown decision, allowing an
unspecified time for adjustment, was the only possible way of
ensuring orderly transition from an old social order to a new.
Millions of people were involved in the transition, and they could
hardly be maneuvered at a moment's notice like small platoons of
26. 287 U.S. at 358.
27. 220 Ark. 601,249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In two cases the Supreme Court ruled
that legislative districts be apportioned according to a "one man, one vote" principle. See
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Note the
prospectivity involved in implementing this new rule. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411
U.S. 192 (1973); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533,585 (1964).
29. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
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plaintiffs or defendants. There would be adjustments to make for
those who had clamored for change as well as for those who had
resisted it. Each group needed time to expand its familiar province
and to learn to live in a wider world. The judicial decision signaling
the change was no simple decision weighing one individual's benefits
or hardships against another's. It contemplated a long-range benefit
for everyone concerned, and abundant time was of the essence to
ensure that objective. There would have been great risk of its failure
had the court ordered its decision to take effect at an appointed hour
or even in an appointed year. Better an interim of trial and error,
however bumbling, with time and time again to heal the breach.
In each of the foregoing cases an unsound rule was properly
displaced, but the new rule was not applied retroactively because the
hardship that retroactivity would entail clearly outweighed its
benefits. In tort cases, however, it is my opinion that the hardship on
parties who would be saddled with an unjust precedent if the
overruling were not made retroactive, ordinarily outweighs any
hardship on those who acted under the old rule or any benefits that
might be derived from limiting the new rule to prospective operation.
Neither the tort-feasor nor the victim normally takes account of
expanding or contracting rules of tort liability except tangentially in
the course of routinely insuring against such liability.
In most cases, the expansion or contraction of tort liability has no
drastic effect on the drafting and cost of insurance policies, but there
may be exceptions. An agency, for example, relying on sovereign or
charitable immunity under established law, may have deemed it
needless to procure insurance. In the event of a judicial decision
ruling against immunity such an agency would be unprepared to meet
the newly created liability.
Decisions in several jurisdictions overruling sovereign or
charitable immunity have sought to guard against hardship in this
regard, but not satisfactorily. Thus in Illinois the court accorded the
benefit of a decision overruling school district immunity to the
plaintiff, but declared that apart from the instant case, the rule would
apply prospectively only.30 Such a solution can result in grossly
unequal treatment of persons similarly situated. It was bound to raise
the question of why there should not be comparable benefit for
others, including those injured in the same accident, whose potential
claims were not yet barred by the statute of limitations or litigated to
final judgment that would raise the bar of res judicata. I can find no
rational justification for distinguishing between tort victims injured
before and after an overruling decision. The hardship on the injured
30. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959).
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persons would seem clearly to outweigh the hardship on the taxpayers
of the community among whom the damages would be distributed.
Even if the agency saw no need to investigate the alleged tort or
prepare a defense, given its reliance on the old rule, any hardship that
might result from its failure to make a possibly adequate defense
would be outweighed by the hardship on the injured who would be
denied any remedy under an unjust rule.
It is equally specious to contend that the party attacking the old
rule should be given the benefit of the new rule as a reward for
litigating the issue,31 with a consequent incentive to others to attack
unsound doctrine. Such a contention is precariously based on
frustration of evenhanded justice. If a case impels a brief for
overruling, the possibility of retroactive application should be
incentive enough and counsel must accept the risk that the court will
not overrule, let alone retroactively. Most cases involve more than
one issue, and there is always the risk of failure on some or all of
them. As Cardozo has noted, "the chance of miscalculation is felt to
be a fair risk of the game of life. .... 32 Furthermore, institutional
litigants with recurring interests in overturning legal rules would find
incentive and reward enough in achieving only prospective
overruling. There might be merit in the argument that counsel would
lack incentive to attack unsound doctrine if prospective overruling
ever became so common that it could be generally anticipated, but
that prospect is remote.
The Minnesota court straddled the issue of prospective versus
retroactive operation of an overruling decision with an unusual
solution that has been labelled "prospective-prospective"
overruling.33 It declared that the defense of sovereign immunity
would no longer be available to school districts, municipal
corporations, and certain other governmental subdivisions with
respect to torts committed after the adjournment of the next regular
session of the Minnesota legislature.34 Its objective was to give the
agencies time to insure and to leave the way open for the legislature
to enlist its abundant resources for comprehensive legislation in the
area. The clear implication was that the formulation of new rules in
this area was a responsibility more appropriate to the legislature than
to the courts. That implication was at odds with an attendant warning
31. See id. at 28, 163 N.E.2d at 97.
32. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 148 (1921).
33. See Note, Prospective-Prospective Overruling, 51 MINN. L. REv. 79 (1966).
34. See Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621,264 Minn. 279, 292, 118 N.W.2d
795, 803 (1962). In an earlier case, the court overruled the doctrine of charitable immunity,
saying "[w]e believe the new rule should apply to the instant case and to all future causes
of action arising after September 15, 1960, the date of the filing of this opinion." Parker v.
Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 28,105 N.W.2d 1,14 (1960).
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that the court would undertake the legislature's responsibility if the
legislature did not. It seems evident that the real, though
unarticulated, reason for prospective overruling in the charitable and
sovereign immunity cases was to forestall legislative opposition to the
new rules.
It would be more rational in such cases for a court to decide for
retroactive operation. The California court so decided, in a decision
liquidating the doctrine of sovereign immunity.35 It reasoned that the
doctrine had been almost uniformly condemned by the
commentators, and had become so riddled with exceptions, via
legislation as well as judicial decision, that "[o]nly the vestigial
remains of such governmental immunity have survived; its requiem
has long been foreshadowed. '36 Under such circumstances, any
hardship to the agency that had failed to take note of the fatal illness
of the old rule was overwhelmed by the hardship that a denial of
recovery would have worked on the injured plaintiff.
The problem of retroactive versus prospective application calls
for the most sensitive balancing of competing claims to justice in the
area of criminal law. The time radius of the decision may directly
affect the freedom or the very life of one accused or convicted of
crime. An ex post facto clause hence exerts its most dramatic
prohibition against retroactivity with regard to statutes that make
conduct criminal that has not been criminal before. Though there is
no comparable prohibition on a court,37 it usually also guards against
any retroactive application of a decision that marks conduct as
criminal for the first time.
In an early case in North Carolina 38 the court found its rationale,
for prospective application in the defendant's reliance on an old
interpretation of the law. He had been prosecuted under a statute
prohibiting unauthorized removal of crops by a sharecropper. An
earlier case39 involving the same statute had held that a sharecropper
might defend by alleging the landlord's breach of contract as
offsetting the amount of rent due. The court overruled the earlier
decision, holding that the statute plainly meant that the crops were to
remain on the land, until all disputes between landlord and
sharecropper were resolved and that any removal of the crops
pending such settlement was a penal offense. The court went on to
hold, however, that since the defendant might have acted on the
35. See Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1961).
36. Id. at 221,359 P.2d at 463, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
37. See note 6 supra.
38. See State v. Bell, 136 N.C. 674,49 S.E. 163 (1904).
39. See State v. Neal, 129 N.C. 692,40 S.E. 205 (1901).
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advice of counsel in reliance on the earlier case, it would be unfair to
deprive him of the defense authorized by that case.
In the unusual New Mexico case of State v. Jones40 the court saw
anew a former defendant. Some years earlier, as the operator of a
motion picture theatre he had used "bank night" to promote
attendance, a common practice during the depression. He was
successful in his defense that "bank night" was not a lottery. Now the
same court concluded, as to the same defendant, that "bank night"
was a lottery but held that the "plainest principles of justice" 41
demanded that the new rule be applied prospectively only. The
court's second thought could not make a lottery of the justifiable
reliance its old rule engendered in the very defendant again before
the court.
Normally, however, reliance plays an inconsequential role, if any,
in criminal cases, as in tort cases. The decisive factor is usually the
injustice of retroactivity, given its penal consequences, as exemplified
in the case of James v. United States.42 At issue was the conviction of
a defendant for "wilfully and knowingly" evading payment of an
income tax on embezzled money. In an earlier case43 the United
States Supreme Court had held that embezzled funds were not
taxable income. Six members of the Court in the James case voted to
overrule that decision, holding that embezzled funds were taxable
income. A differently composed group of six justices, however, voted
not to convict James; three on the ground that the old rule still
prevailed when he failed to pay the tax, and hence made it impossible
to prove wilful evasion; and three on the ground that the old rule was
correct. Accordingly, there was no retroactive application of the new
interpretation of the statute. It is hardly persuasive that James failed
to report his income in reliance on the old rule; there was an equal
likelihood that he concealed his income to avoid prosecution for
embezzlement. Though no element of reliance is present, the James
decision is responsive to the principle that the retroactive operation
of a rule imposing or expanding criminal liability would be inherently
unfair.
In a few jurisdictions, courts may convict persons of crimes even
though the conduct charged against them is nowhere specified by
statute as criminal.44 These jurisdictions punish so-called "common
40. 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940). See also State v. Longino, 109 Miss. 125, 67 So.
902 (1915).
41. 44 N.M. at 631,107 P.2d at 329.
42. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
43. See Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
44. See, e.g., State ex rel. Farrior v. Faulk, 102 Fla. 886, 136 So. 601 (1931); State v.
Bradbury, 136 Me. 347, 9 A.2d 657 (1939); State ex rel. Maples v. Quinn, 217 Miss. 567, 64
So. 2d 711 (1953); Commonwealth v. Mochan, 177 Pa. Super. 454, 110 A.2d 788 (1955).
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law offenses," acts that fall expressly or by analogy within some
common law decision, however ancient and obscure. Predominantly
they are acts characterized as immoral, obscene, or in some such wise
offensive.
These so-called "morals offenses" create refractory problems of
retroactivity. Usually a defendant cannot divine that a decision will
make criminal the conduct he engaged in. Retroactivity in the
common law of crime, attended by penal sanctions, may be
particularly oppressive when the defendant's conduct lacks any
element of mens rea. It is reasoning in a circle to attribute
consciousness of wrongdoing to a defendant on the sole ground that
since his conduct is now adjudged offensive to widely held community
standards of basic morality, its criminal nature should have been
known to him.
It may avail little to a defendant to exercise his right to a jury
trial when charged with an allegedly criminal offense, not against a
person or property, but against the abstraction of public morality.
Given that indeterminate abstraction, randomly selected jurors have
the same large discretion as a trial judge to adjudge conduct criminal
that has nowhere been so specified.
Judicial discretion, whether of trial judge or jury, is also an
indeterminate abstraction elusive of constitutional limitation. An
appellate court is wary of countermanding the discretionary judgment
of the triers of fact unless there is patent abuse of their discretion, a
phrase whose own vagueness matches the abstraction to which it
relates. Thus two indeterminate abstractions, one encompassing
conduct allegedly criminally offensive and the other encompassing
judicial discretion to adjudge conduct as criminally offensive, interact
to create a vicious circle. It might better be described as a vicious
vortex, into whose vacuum every person risks being drawn. It is a
very present danger whose sinister aspects ironically are camouflaged
by the ceremonious judicial process through which it moves. The
courtroom, whose judges and jury are regarded as the intent
guardians of fair procedure, lends itself to a vitiation of the procedure
whenever the guardians freely invoke their discretion to stigmatize
conduct as criminal and to apply the punishment retroactively.
Transcending the injury to the one thus condemned by the
erratic operation of judicial discretion is the oppressive censorship it
threatens to all others. Even if the threat does not materialize
immediately or on a large scale, it exerts a damaging influence against
the diversity of custom and thought that characterizes the open
pluralistic society. Those aware of the threat tend to stifle
themselves, to fit their conduct to prevailing patterns, to speak only
the speech of the sickly sweet lest they offend a majority well able to
mobilize its deadly innocence against any questioning words.
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As for those who are not aware of any threat, or are not in fear
of it, they risk more imminent injury. The first among them to be
criminally prosecuted may be those whose offenses are so close to
specified crimes as to seem properly punishable. But each such
punishment broadens the area of prosecution and the number of
those who may be caught in it. No one can forget that in our own
time, in purportedly civilized countries, millions have thus been
caught who have committed no greater offense than to be themselves.
In Ginzburg v. United States,45 three of the four dissenting
justices viewed the majority decision as a retroactive expansion of
criminal liability for conduct not hitherto specified as a crime. The
decision, interpreting a federal statute on obscenity,46 adjudged the
defendants guilty of mailing obscene matter. Even though the
majority opinion assumed that the magazines actually mailed were
not obscene, it attributed to the mailing an obscenity derived from the
manner in which the magazines were advertised and prepared for
mailing. Thus the court greatly broadened the sweep of an already
sweeping statute. Something new has been added to the normal
question under such a statute: What was defendant doing? It is now
in order in the courtroom to ask: What did he think he was doing?
With this subtle interpolation of motive in a statute on its face
concerned only with obscene matter, whatever that vague term may
mean, what are the limits of the growth possibilities of obscenity as a
crime? Those who prosecute for obscenity need not prove that the
defendant was murdering the English language or even roughing it
up. The crucial question is not only how the defendant conducts
himself, but whether his motive was pure. Evil to him who evil
thinks.
The pudding, of course, is in the proof. Since the proof of evil
motive is not called for by the statute, Ginzburg could have become
an endless pudding, spilling into little ones into every corner of the
United States. It is not quieting to envisage the many custodians of
morals who perennially stand ready to put in their plums, and pull out
their thumbs, and say: What a good boy am I.
The plum puddings in the United States are no more spectacular
than those of the mother country. The Ginzburg case finds a foggy
peer in the English case of Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions,
47
highlighting the durability of the conspiracy net in common law. The
defendant published a "Ladies' Directory," listing the names and
addresses of prostitutes. He was convicted of publishing an obscene
booklet under the Obscene Publications Act of 1959, superseding
45. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
47. [1962] A.C. 220.
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common law rules hitherto governing obscene publications. He was
also convicted of conspiracy to corrupt public morals, an offense
declared by the trial judge to be a common law misdemeanor. The
Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed the conviction and the House of
Lords reaffirmed. In the reaffirmation, the majority adhered to a
view of the court as custos morum of the people, as they say in
English, or as Latins might say, the moral custodian. There was an
oddly archaic sound to the purportedly forward-looking speech of
several that equated the conspiracy conviction with the right and duty
of the court to keep the common law of crimes responsive to current
public policy. Thus Viscount Simonds declared, "The law must be
related to the changing standards of life, not yielding to every shifting
impulse of the popular will but having regard to fundamental
assessments of human values and the purposes of society.
'48
Lord Reid dissented, stating that "[w]here Parliament fears to
tread, it is not for the courts to rush in.... [T]he courts cannot now
create a new offense, or a new kind of criminal conspiracy .... -49 In
1973, ten years after the Shaw case, over a vigorous and persuasive
dissent by Lord Diplock, the House of Lords held in Knuller, Ltd. v.
Director of Public Prosecutions50 that the publishers of International
Times were properly convicted of conspiracy to corrupt public morals
by publishing advertisements by homosexuals for companionship with
other homosexuals. In this case Lord Reid voted with the majority
despite his continuing belief that Shaw was wrongly decided and that
under its 1966 Practice Statement the House of Lords was free to
abandon erroneous earlier decisions. He justified his concurrence in
Knuller on the ground that there had been at least thirty convictions
for the new crime in the intervening ten years and that Parliament
had enacted relevant statutes without repudicating the rule in Shaw's
case. In his view general acceptance of that rule had made it law and
"however wrong or anomalous the decision may be it must stand and
apply to cases reasonably analogous unless or until it is altered by
Parliament."51  I would here reiterate my own view that the
responsibility of overruling judge-made bad law rests with judges and
should not thus be shifted to Parliament. I do not believe that bad
law becomes enshrined by a supposed public acceptance that may be
no more than public indifference. Law, good or bad, is made by
courts and legislatures operating under appropriate judicial or
legislative procedures, not by public indifference or acquiescence.
Vagaries in the criminal law of conspiracy in sequence of Shaw
48. Id. at 268.
49. Id. at 275-76.
50. [1972] 2 All E.R. 898.
51. Id. at 903.
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and Knuller have a disturbing range of propagation, as in the rule that
a conspiracy to commit a tort is criminal. Thus in the Kamara case,
52
students from Sierra Leone who protested against the policies of the
party in power in their country and wished to call public attention to
their grievances were prosecuted for occupying the premises in
London of the High Commission for Sierra Leone. They were
convicted on a charge of conspiracy to trespass, and the Court of
Appeal affirmed their convictions on the syllogism that an agreement
to do an unlawful act is a criminal conspiracy; trespass is an unlawful
act; an agreement to commit trespass is therefore a criminal
conspiracy. The major premise not only begs the question, but begets
others. As Lord Diplock declared in his dissent in Knuller: "[I]t is the
height of sophistry to say that the doing of the acts in concert which
alone can have harmful consequences is not what the law regards as
meriting punishment, but that the prior agreement to do them is.
' '53
Such curious outcroppings of judicial creativity in a normally
staid domain are not rendered safe and sane by virtue of bearing tags
of prestigious authority. Nonetheless we can view Shaw, Knuller, and
Kamara as aberrations. The traditional defenses against retroactivity
of new rules of criminal law that would adversely affect a defendant
are still firmly entrenched.
54
52. Kamara v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1973] 2 All E.R. 1242.
53. [1972] 2 All E.R. at 921.
54. There may be a trend toward retroactivity of new rules that would beneficently
affect a defendant. Contraction of criminal liability can take various forms: a court
declares a criminal statute unconstitutional; a legislature repeals a criminal statute
expressly or by implication, or repeals a statute and later substantially reenacts it; or a
court-reinterprets a criminal statute to the advantage of defendants, either by narrowing
the scope of the statute or by articulating new defenses to it. These examples warrant
examination.
Ifi the simplest example, when a court declares a criminal statute unconstitutional, the
invariable rule is that all defendants previously convicted under that statute are entitled to
release, whether their convictions are final or not. The rule is at least as old as an 1879 case
in whicfi the United States Supreme Court declared that a conviction under an
unconstitutional statute is void and therefore subject to collateral attack. See Ex Parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,376-77 (1879).
A for legislative repeal of a criminal statute, it was normally attended at common law
by automatic abatement of all prosecutions under it, on the presumption that the
legislati'on intended repeal to operate as a pardon for past acts. Abatement did not extend,
however, to final convictions, probably because of the originally limited nature of habeas
corpni' and general unavailability of remedies via collateral attack in early
Anglo-American law. Moreover, since there was no abatement the legislature clearly
could not have intended a pardon, as when the new statute merely affected the manner of
punishment, or merely took over the field from the old, or substantially reenacted the old,
as in the case of codifications, consolidations or revisions.
The problems of legislative repeal are exemplified in two modem cases decided by
the Supreme Court. See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964); Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226 (1964). In Bell, "sit-in" demonstrators had been convicted of criminal
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trespass. While their case was pending on writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court, the Maryland legislature enacted "public accommodation" laws that gave them a
right to be in public restaurants and therefore probably rendered the defendants'
supposed trespass noncriminal. Like many states, Maryland had a "saving clause" to avoid
the common law rule of automatic abatement on repeal, but there was some doubt
whether the clause applied to petitioners' convictions. The Supreme Court therefore
reversed and remanded to the Maryland court to determine whether under state law the
prosecutions against petitioners might be deemed abated under the new statute. The
Maryland Supreme Court affirmed their convictions. Bell v. State, 236 Md. 356, 204 A.2d
54 (1964).
In contrast, in Hamm, petitioners' "sit-in" conduct had been rendered noncriminal by
a federal statute, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970). The United States
Supreme Court held that the convictions, still on direct review when the Civil Rights Act
was enacted, were abated by the federal statute rendering their conduct noncriminal.
An analogous situation arises when a court reinterprets a criminal statute so as to
narrow it, thus essentially repealing the statute as to some defendants. In this area, one
decision aroused much criticism. See Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1941). In
Warring, a defendant had been convicted in 1939 under a federal contempt statute that
punished conduct in the presence of the court or "so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice." At the time of the defendant's conviction case law required a
causal rather than a geographical link between the offending conduct and the offended
court. See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918). Two years after
Warring's conviction, however, the Supreme Court reversed itself, holding that the
contempt statute required geographic proximity between conduct and court. See Nye v.
United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941). Under this new interpretation, Warring might not have
been guilty of criminal contempt, but the court denied habeas corpus.
A comparable decision has been rendered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a
case where the petitioner had been convicted of first degree felony-murder in the course
of a robbery. His victim, a policeman, had actually been killed by a bullet from the gun of
a fellow policeman during the fracas of the robbery. Commonwealth ex rel. Almeida v.
Rundle, 409 Pa. 460, 187 A.2d 266, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 815 (1963). Long after the
petitioner's conviction the Pennsylvania court adopted a new theory of felony-murder that
could have removed his crime from that category. See Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa.
486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958). The Pennsylvania court, however, denied habeas corpus in
Rundle, holding that criminal convictions are to be governed by the law in force at the
time of the conviction. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Almeida v.
Rundle, 374 U.S. 815 (1963).
Sometimes there are legislative changes in punishment. They are usually subject to a
rule precluding retroactive application to defendants whose convictions have become
final. Such a rule is of course inevitable as to increases in punishment, where retroactive
application would not be constitutionally permissible under the usual ex post facto clause.
As to statutes mitigating punishment, however, there is no constitutional barrier to
retroactive application, and there are compelling arguments in its favor. Once the
legislature adopts a lesser penalty as adequate, the retention of the harsher penalty no
longer serves any legitimate penological goal. Hence we declared in California that when a
criminal statute is amended to mitigate punishment after the prohibited act was
committed, but before a final judgment of conviction is entered, the amended statute
governs. See In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740,408 P.2d 448,48 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1965).
The rationale of Estrada would seem to be equally applicable to a defendant whose
judgment of conviction has become final. An early case decided otherwise. See State v.
Addington, 18 S.C.L. Rpts. 516 (1831). The petitioner in that case was convicted of horse
stealing and sentenced to death. Meanwhile an amendment to the penal statutes reduced
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We turn now to the cluster of recently formulated constitutional
rules relating to criminal detection, detention, and trial.55 They begin
with the Bill of Rights as applied to the states via the fourteenth
amendment, an application that has gained momentum since the
propelling concept of ordered liberty enunciated in Palko v.
Connecticut.56 They culminate in rules that would be beneficent to
the defendant if retroactively applied.
It would seem that since the new rules have a common ground in
the concept of ordered liberty, defined as "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," 57 they
would by definition be of universal application. Hence they would
reach backward in time as well as forward, to apply retroactively even
though they might upset final judgments. Thus the United States
Supreme Court declared in 1963 that "conventional notions of finality
of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and
infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.
5 8
Since that noble declaration the Court has applied some but not
all of the beneficent rules retroactively. Why not all? The question is
basic, compelling us to seek out the considerations that in some cases
dictated prospective operation only.
The fourth amendment cases demonstrate that rules of ordered
liberty might operate with less than absolute retroactivity, however
absolute a ring they have in the abstract. The fourth amendment of
the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures by government agents, and Mapp v. Ohio59 extended to the
states the federal rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of that
amendment. Mapp generated concern throughout the country as to
whether it would apply retroactively not only to cases on appeal but
also to final judgments. In my own state I confronted the problem in
the punishment to whipping, imprisonment, and a fine. The court refused to apply the
lesser punishment retroactively on the ground that it loses all power over a case once a
judgment becomes final. It nevertheless recognized the harshness of the rule and strongly
recommended executive clemency.
Modern decisions extending the scope of habeas corpus have militated against such
unbending finality of judgments in criminal law. Moreover, in states such as California, a
system of indeterminate sentencing serves to keep a petitioner's case open. The Adult
Authority may redetermine his sentence at any point up to the maximum term. CAL. PEN.
CODE §§ 1168,3020,3023,5077 (West 1970).
55. See generally Address by Roger Traynor, "The Devils of Due Process in Criminal
Detection, Detention, And Trial," Twenty-third Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture,
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, April 19, 1966, in 33 U. CHI. L REV. 657
(1966).
56. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
57. Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934).
58. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
59. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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a concurring opinion in In re Harris.60 Some years earlier in People v.
Cahan,61 California had anticipated the Mapp decision by adopting
the exclusionary rule. Instead of making it a rule of constitutional
dimension, however, we made it a rule of evidence. Hence its
violation afforded no ground for collateral attack on final judgments.
It was perforce turned into a constitutional rule by Mapp, and the
question arose as to whether it must now apply with full retroactivity.
In deciding against such retroactivity, in In re Harris, I noted that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to protect the guilty but to
deter unconstitutional police practices. It seems clear that deterrence
would be served but little more and at exhorbitant cost by affording
the weapon of collateral attack to those defendants who were
convicted before the adoption of the exclusionary rule and hence had
no way of challenging the admissibility of the evidence.
The most telling reason for collateral attack on judgments of
conviction is that it operates to eliminate the risk of convicting the
innocent. Such a risk attends any conviction ensuing from the witting
use of perjured testimony, the suppression of evidence, an involuntary
confession, the denial of an opportunity to present a defense, and the
denial of the right to counsel. A comparable risk arises upon failure
to provide an indigent defendant with a trial transcript necessary to
perfect an appeal.
The most telling distinction of a defendant convicted on evidence
resulting from an unreasonable search or seizure is that he is clearly
guilty. It is not the purpose of the exclusionary rule to protect the
guilty. Its purpose to detect lawless enforcement will be amply served
in any state by affording defendants an orderly procedure for
challenging the admissibility of the evidence at or before trial and on
appeal.62
The views set forth in the Harris case gained strength when the
United States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker63 decided against
60. 56 Cal. 2d 879, 880, 366 P.2d 305, 306, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 890 (1961). The rule of
Mapp would apply, as in Mapp itself, to cases that had not yet reached final judgment.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 103 (1801). See also Vandenbark v. Owen-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
61. 44 Cal. 2d 434,282 P.2d 905 (1955).
62. See Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large In The Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319
Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search And Seizure Practices, 34
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 150 (1962).
63. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Some of the most significant cases since Linkletter, in addition
to those discussed in the text, in which the United States Supreme Court has applied its
new rules prospectively include Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972); Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); Halliday v.
United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Fuller v.
Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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any retroactive application of Mapp that would upset judgments that
became final before Mapp. It invoked as a test "no likelihood of
unreliability" in the factfinding process.64 Given reliability, the Court
was free to weigh official reliance and the advantages of orderly
transition against the usual factors in favor of retroactive application
of judicial rules.
New problems of retroactivity were soon to arise in the now
famous cases that have worked basic changes in criminal procedure
through the usual ordered liberty route of the fourteenth amendment.
When Malloy v. Hogan65 extended to the states the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, it cast a formidable shadow on a
rule followed in six states allowing comment on the defendant's
failure to take the stand to explain or deny facts when he could
reasonably be expected to do so. Nevertheless, we still felt free in
California to uphold such a rule in People v. Modesto,66 reaffirming
the validity of a state constitutional provision that allowed restricted
comment on the silence of a defendant in a criminal trial. My opinion
in that case, however, proved to be only the next to the last words in
my state. It is now displaced by the famous last words of the United
States Supreme Court in Griffin v. California.67
The United States Supreme Court relied at least in part on the
theory that the comment rule impaired the reliability of the
fact-finding process. Given this relation back to the Linkletter test, it
seemed logical that the Griffin rule would be given the retroactive
application adumbrated in the Linkletter test. In the subsequent case
of Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,68 however, the Court
considered the appropriateness of retroactivity under a new test: Was
there a "clear danger of convicting the innocent" unless there were
retroactive application of the beneficent new rule? This language is
not a restatement on all fours with the Linkletter test: Would there be
"no likelihood of unreliability," in the factfinding process, and hence
no likelihood of convicting the innocent if there were no retroactive
application?
It was no easy matter for the Court, after it had taken its stand in
Griffin against comment, to decide in Tehan against complete
retroactivity of the Griffin rule. This compromise was designed to
preclude the Griffin rule from upsetting final judgments in the
jurisdictions that had allowed comment.
Once the Court undertook such adjustment, it gained freedom to
64. 381 U.S. at 638.
65. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
66. 62 Cal. 2d 436,398 P.2d 753,42 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965).
67. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
68. 382 U.S. 406, 416,(1966).
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decide against any retroactive application of the new rules on police
interrogation announced in the historic cases of Escobedo v. Illinois69
and Miranda v. Arizona .70 It came as a surprise, however, that when
it did so in Johnson v. New Jersey,71 it specified a cutoff date that is
baffling except in terms of expediency. Even though the case arose
on habeas corpus and hence could have been governed by the
Linkletter and Tehan tests, the Court chose to reject the final
judgment cut-off. It held instead "that Escobedo affects only those
cases in which the trial began after June 22, 1964, the date of that
decision. We hold further that Miranda applies only to cases in which
the trial began after the date of our decision one week ago." 72
The Court made this choice between the two alternatives it
postulated: whether the rules "shall affect cases still on direct appeal
when they were decided or whether their application shall commence
with trials begun after the decisions were announced. ' 73 Apparently
it departed from the final judgment cutoff because it would have been
compelled to apply the Escobedo and Miranda rules to cases then
pending on appeal, something it did not wish to undertake.
The Court's choice is hard to justify, whatever its expedience. It
meant that no cases would be reversed in consequence of the new
rule during the given transitional period. It is difficult to reconcile the
Court's own reference to immutable principles and to binding
guarantees newly discovered in the century-old fourteenth
amendment with a declaration that they are to have no effect until
after June 22, 1964.
From among the cases pending that raised the Miranda issues,
the Supreme Court applied the Miranda rule to only 4 and denied
certiorari in the remaining 129 cases. The denial of relief from
imprisonment or death on the basis of an arbitrary date raises a grave
question of equal protection. If those whose cases were pending were
reliably found guilty and hence did not deserve relief, the inequity
remains that a few among them nonetheless did receive relief.
So glaring an inequity is not dispelled by a rationalization that
the lucky few were only incidental beneficiaries of a technique
designed to avert wholesale reversals. For better or worse, the
technique of the Johnson case is on the books, open to further use.
We can anticipate that it will be urged by advocates seeking to make
palatable a proposed change in criminal law or even in civil law. Thus
a technique envisaged as an interim expedient may invite carelessness
69. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
70. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
71. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
72. Id. at 721.
73. Id. at 732.
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and induce otherwise reluctant judges to join in the announcement of
a new rule. It can be used to temporize whenever a new rule is
announced too precipitously for consistent and equitable application.
There is wisdom in the Linkletter and Tehan tests that preclude
retroactivity to the extent of upsetting final judgments, when there is
no appreciable risk that innocent defendants have been convicted.
Without such risk, the doctrine of res judicata, which precludes
collateral attack on final judgments in civil cases, should apply with
equal force in criminal cases. Precluding complete retroactivity by
adherence to conventional doctrine does not present any question of
prospective overruling. The new rule is applied retroactively within
the conventional limits that have traditionally governed the
application of new rules.
There is no wisdom, however, in the technique invoked in
Johnson v. New Jersey.74 Equal justice before the law has been the
proud boast of Anglo-American judges for generations. Why then
give 4 defendants, Miranda, Vignera, Westover, and Stewart, the
benefit of the new rule and deny it to the other 129 defendants whose
pending cases also raised the Miranda issue? As Justice Harlan has
noted in another case,75 the court was "[s]imply fishing one case from
the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing
new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar
cases to flow by unaffected by that new rule.. .. ,,76 It was purely
fortuitous that the case of the four lucky defendants given the benefit
of the new Miranda rules was heard ahead of the other cases. As
Justice Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court has noted, "Too many
irrelevant considerations, including the common cold, bear upon the
rate of progress of a case through the judicial system."
'77
The apparent reason for this lack of evenhanded justice was to
meet the case or controversy test in article III of the United States
Constitution, and to render the new rule invulnerable to the claim
that it would have been mere dictum had it been applied
prospectively only. In my opinion the question whether a new rule
should be applied prospectively is just as much an issue in a case as
the question whether the old rule should be displaced at all.
Before considering the why of a prospective overruling decision,
we must understand that it is the culmination of a process involving
two issues. First, in the course of pondering the hitherto governing
rule in the context of the instant case and any relevant predecessor
74. Id.
75. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
76. Id. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring).
77. Schaefer, The Control of Sunburst Technique of Prospective Overruling, 42
N.Y.U.L. REV. 631,645 (1967).
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cases, a court decides that it is inadequate or inept and must give way
to an appropriately formulated new rule. It must then go on to decide
whether it will operate most justly if it is given the usual retroactive
application to the very case before the court that has provided the
impetus toward a new rule. If the court decides against retroactive
application, as in a case where it would work undue hardship upon a
party that has justifiably relied on the old rule, it is driven to a dual
resolution of the problem in a bifurcated decision, announcing the
new rule for prospective application only and allowing the old rule to
apply in the case before the court.
Each part of the bifurcated decision springs from an actual
controversy between the parties. The decision to liquidate the old
rule springs from its unfitness to govern such cases. The decision to
pay final respects to the doomed rule springs from such
considerations as the justifiability of a party's reliance on an old rule,
given that it may induce reliance by the very authority of its existence,
if not by its fitness. It bears emphasis that each part of the decision is
essential to a proper resolution of the case. Neither is dictum. 78
The parties should have an opportunity to be heard on each issue
and the court should have the benefit afforded by adversary litigation
of the briefs and argument of counsel thereon.79 By continuing a case
for such briefs and argument when it is not yet clear whether
prospectivity will be an issue, a court ensures that the resolution of
such an issue will not have to await a subsequent case. It thus
precludes the uncertainty that would otherwise bedevil counsel and
other courts in the interim.
Furthermore, the issue of retroactivity should not be decided
summarily as the United States Supreme Court has done. A reasoned
opinion should demonstrate why the issue was resolved as it was.
Assertion without reasons is unnecessary when reasons are
available.., and unwise in any circumstance; it leads too easily to
the suspicion that the law of the case is based upon power alone,
and not upon reasoned analysis and judgment.80
Moreover, I find inadequate such criteria as the Supreme Court
has invoked for governing the issue of prospectivity, namely, the
purpose of the new rule, the extent of reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and the effect on the administration
of justice.8' The inadequacy lies mainly in the failure to weigh against
78. See Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA.
L. REv. 201, 216-27 (1965); Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35
U. ILL. L. REv. 121,151 (1940).
79. See Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application, supra note 16, at 936-37.
80. Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application, supra note 16, at 939.
81. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
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the foregoing considerations the hardship and inequity suffered by
those who are denied the benefit of the new rule and compelled to
bear the burden of what is now admittedly recognized as an unjust
rule. Their hardship, particularly when imprisonment and death are
at stake, would seem to outweigh the reliance of law enforcement
agencies and the increased burden on the administration of justice
that equal treatment of those equally situated would entail.
The foregoing review of the technique of prospective overruling
as it has developed in the United States illustrates its possibilities for
developing the law rationally in the interest of justice by repudiating
unsound doctrine. The review also notes the dangers of inept use of
the technique and the need not only for caution but for rational
criteria to govern its proper use. It was properly used, I believe, in
many of the illustrations I have set forth, but improperly used in such
cases as Johnson v. New Jersey.82
The criteria I would suggest are: clear demonstrations that a
precedent must be overruled, that the new rule is the best of all
possible replacements, and that the hardship on a party who has
relied on the old rule outweighs the hardship on the party denied the
benefit of the new rule. Since there are few cases where such rigorous
demonstrations can be made, there should be few occasions when
prospective overruling can justifiably displace the normal retroactive
application of an overruling decision.
We turn now to the outlook for prospective overruling in
England. For generations the House of Lords deemed itself without
power to overrule its decisions. Thus as early as 1860 in Attorney
General v. Windsor,83 Lord Campbell noted that House of Lords
decisions "are binding upon itself when sitting judicially, as much as
upon all inferior tribunals.... [They] can be altered only by Act of
Parliament." 84 Again in 1861, in Beamish v. Bearnish85 Lord Campbell
declared that if a House of Lords decision "were not considered as
equally binding upon your Lordships, the House would be arrogating
to itself the right of altering the law, and legislating by its own
separate authority. ' 86  There are echoes of Blackstone in this
magisterial declaration beaming the message that when the House
decides a case, it is merely finding the law, but when it overrules a
case, it is legislating. The doctrine that the House could not overrule
itself took firm hold in 1898 in London Street Tramways Co. v.
82. See United States ex reL Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413 (1966).
83. 11 Eng. Rep. 472 (1860).
84. Id. at 481.
85. 11 Eng. Rep. 735 (1861).
86. Id. at 761.
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London County Council 7 in which Lord Halsbury noted the
"disastrous inconvenience-of having.., the dealings of mankind
rendered doubtful .... "s88 One can only muse how much the dealings
of mankind might have improved with the benefit of a doubt now and
then properly dubbed as a judicial deliberation. Only in 1966 did the
House at long last liberate itself from the bondage of Windsor,
Beamish, and London Tramways in its famous Practice Statement of
that year.89 I quote the statement in full because its substance and
implications are essential to any analysis of the prospects of
prospective overruling in English law. Such analysis would have been
idle in an era when the single word "overruling" was not pronounced
in polite reasoning circles.
The 1966 Practice Statement provides:
Their Lordships regard the use of precedent (1) as an indispensable
foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application
to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty
upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as
well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules.
Their Lordships nevertheless recognize that too rigid adherence to
precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly
restrict the proper development of the law. They propose,
therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating
former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from
a previous decision when it appears right to do so.
In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing
retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlements or
property and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also
the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law.
This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent
elsewhere than in this House.90
Note the word "retrospectively" in the third paragraph of the
statement. Even without that word the statement assures the public
that the House will bear in mind the danger of any disturbance of the
basis on which contracts et cetera have been entered into. If such
assurance were all that was intended, the word "retrospectively" is
redundant. It seems likely that their Lordships included the word
"retrospectively" to demonstrate their awareness of the normal
retroactivity that attends any overruling. A determined advocate of
prospective overruling might also hypothesize that the excess caution
on retrospective disturbance was intended to leave the way open for
prospective overruling in the light of the experience with that
87. [1898] A.C. 375,380.
88. Id. at 380.
89. [1966] 3 All E.R. 77.
90. Id.
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technique in the United States, with which the House was
undoubtedly familiar.
Despite the 1966 Practice Statement, the House of Lords has
abided by traditional pre-1966 techniques. Thus in Conway v.
Rimmer,91 the House was faced with the broad language in Duncan v.
Cammel n2 that if the Crown asserts that the production of a
document would be "injurious to the public interest" or that secrecy
of a class of documents is "necessary for the proper conduct of the
public service," that assertion is final and conclusive and the
document need not be produced. As Professor Julius Stone has
noted:
This was a rather unlimited proposition. The House, nevertheless,
found it possible in Conway v. Rimmer in 1968 (that is, after the
1966 Practice Statement) to sweep the proposition aside without
departing from it. What they rather said was that, however solemn
and unanimous Viscount Simon's formulation, and however wide
his intention, the House was dealing with Duncan's case with naval
documents about submarines in wartime; while they were now
dealing in Conway v. Rimmer with police reports. He was dealing
with centralized government operations, they were dealing with
local government. And they pointed to half-a-dozen differentiae of
this kind.9
3
The reluctance of the House of Lords to turn over the new leaves
of the 1966 Practice Statement results in such puzzlers as the Jones v.
Secretary of State for Social Services case.94 Four Lords, Wilberforce,
Dilhorne, Diplock, and Simon, agreed that Dowling's case, 95 a
previous decision of the House of Lords, was wrong. Only three of
them, however, were convinced that the House should overrule that
case under the 1966 Statement. The fourth, Lord Simon of Glaisdale,
was unwilling to do so. The remaining three Lords, Lord Reid, Lord
Morris of Borth-y-Gest, and Lord Pearson, were of the opinion that
Dowling's case was right, but that even if it were wrong, the House
should not overrule it. Thus the baffling conclusion is that the
admitted unsoundness of a precedent does not justify overruling it.
Dowling's case involved a claim for injury benefit under the
National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Acts. The case held that a
decision by the statutory authorities that the injury occurred in an
accident arising out of and in the course of the claimant's employment
was final and binding on the medical authorities with respect to a
91. [1968] A.C. 910.
92. [1942] A.C. 624.
93. Stone, On the Liberation of Appellate Judges: How Not To Do It!, 3 MODERN L.
REv. 449,462-63 (1972).
94. Jones v. Secretary of State for Social Services, [1972] 1 All E.R. 145.
95. Minister of Social Security v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, [1967] 1 All E.R.
210.
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subsequent claim for disablement benefit based on the same accident.
If Dowling's case was wrongly decided then not only were Dowling,
Jones, and similar claimants awarded disablement benefits that
Parliament had not authorized, but claimants to whom the medical
authorities would have awarded disablement benefits were denied
benefits Parliament contemplated they should have. The doctrine of
res judicata, however, would preclude collateral attack on final
judgments in either class of case. Had their Lordships undertaken to
overrule Dowling's case they would have restored the statutory plan
envisioned by Parliament and precluded new departures from that
plan. Such a course would have done no violence to the reasonable
expectations of claimants; it is hardly credible that they would have
accidents in reliance on such a rule as that in Dowling's case.
Administrative adjustments to a new rule presumably could be made
without undue difficulty, but in any event administrative practices
should be in accord with those contemplated by Parliament.
Although no question of reliance by either claimants or
administrative agencies was presented in the Jones case, such a
question might conceivably arise in a future case, given the failure in
the Jones case to overrule a precedent that the majority deemed
wrong. Nonetheless, a party could hardly make a plausible case for
reliance on the basis of an already dubious precedent. There should
hence be no obstacles to an outright overruling of the precedent if it is
again placed in issue.
In my opinion Dowling's case should have been overruled in the
Jones case. Moreover, the now admittedly sound interpretation of
the Parliamentary scheme should have been applied retroactively, for
there are no plausible reasons for applying that interpretation
prospectively.
In the "afterthoughts" of his speech in the Jones case Lord Simon
voices his own unease with the decision in light of the 1966 Practice
Statement. He noted that he was
left with the feeling that, theoretically, in some way the most
satisfactory outcome of these appeals would have been to have
allowed them on the basis that they were governed by the decision
in Dowling's case, but to have overruled that decision
prospectively. Such a power-to overrule prospectively a previous
decision but so as not necessarily to affect the parties before the
court-is exercisable by the Supreme Court of the United States,
which has held it to be based in common law: see Linkletter v.
Walker.
96
Lord Simon went on to observe that the pretense that judges were not
makers of law but merely its discoverers and expounders had its
96. [1972] 1 All E.R. 145, 198.
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value.
[I]n limiting the sphere of lawmaking by the judiciary (inevitably at
some disadvantage in assessing the potential repercussions of any
decision, and increasingly so in a complex modem industrial
society), and thus also in emphasizing that central feature of our
constitution, the sovereignty of Parliament. But the true, even if
limited, nature of judicial lawmaking has been more widely
acknowledged of recent years; and the declaration of 26th July 1966
may be partly regarded as of a piece with that process.
97
An advocate of prospective overruling would subscribe to the use
of that technique by their Lordships, and indeed by the judges of the
Court of Appeal once they are unchained from Young v. Bristol
Aeroplane Co.,9s as "no more than a logical extension of present
realities and of powers already claimed." The advocate would find
encouragement in Lord Simon's suggestion, and Lord Diplock's
concurrence therein, that such an extension should be "seriously
considered." The advocate, however, would hardly agree that such an
extension "would preferably be the subject matter of Parliamentary
enactment." The problem is so manifestly a judicial one that the
responsibility for its solution on a case by case evolution in the course
of the traditional judicial process should remain with judges.
Prospective overruling calls for sensitive and timely adjustments.
There is no reason for judges to abdicate such a uniquely judicial
responsibility. Legislators cannot formulate a definitive all-purpose
plan for prospective overruling that would be feasible.
An advocate of prospective overruling would not be dissuaded
by Lord Simon's objections that the initiative for such a task should
not be taken by the House of Lords itself. The answer to his
Lordship's objections, in the order in which he presented them, might
be somewhat as follows: In the first place, if there is informed
professional opinion that their Lordships have no power to overrule
decisions with prospective effect only, that alone should not be an
insuperable obstacle. Although such opinion should always be
seriously considered and may be one source of law, it is not itself law
and is not binding on their Lordships "sitting judicially." Secondly,
any suspicion that an amplification of the 1966 Practice Statement by
the House would "be endeavouring to upset one-sidedly the
constitutional balance between executive, legislature and judiciary"
could be allayed by a clear demonstration that a precedent had to be
overruled, that the hardship on the party who had relied on it
outweighed the hardship on the party denied the benefit of the new
rule. Moreover, as Lord Diplock has noted, it "is not an essential
97. Id. at 198.
98. [1944] 1 K.B. 718.
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feature of the judicial process" that a new precedent be applied
retroactively. 99  One might add that it is not essential to the
constitutional balance that only the legislature make a precedent
operate prospectively.1°° Thirdly, the concomitant problems his
Lordship noted as worthy of serious consideration are at most
tangential to the technique of prospective overruling.
I have saved to the last a 1675 case'01 discovered by Professor
Leach in which Lord Nottingham set forth the general Chancery pol-
icy that those who relied on overruled statements of law "are to be
protected." In this case
[i]t appears that there was a 'received opinion' that a certain Eliza-
bethan statute did not apply to the Crown; a tenant then laid out
money in erecting a building in reliance upon that opinion. When
the law was declared to be otherwise in a decided case, it was held
that the 'new law' was inapplicable to the relying tenant.102
99. Address by Lord Diplock, "The Courts As Legislators," Presidential Address, The
Holdsworth Club, 1965.
100. Indeed, there is a serious question in the United States whether the legislature can
even do so. The California Supreme Court overruled an old precedent on state
constitutional grounds that had governed the taxation of private leaseholds on tax-exempt
public property. It applied its new rule retroactively after weighing the considerations pro
and con. Then the legislature came into the picture and after weighing the considerations
on its own scales, retimed the new rule so it would not apply retroactively to leases
negotiated prior to its adoption. When this legislative retiming was put to the test in
Forster Shipbuilding Co. v. County of Los Angeles, we upheld it, stating: "[T]emporary
application of the rule of an overruled case may be prescribed by appropriate legislation as
well as by judicial decision, for the legislature is no less competent than the court to
evaluate the hardships involved and decide whether considerations of fairness and public
policy warrant the granting of relief." Forster Shipbuilding Co. v. County of Los Angeles,
54 Cal. 2d 450, 459, 353 P.2d 736, 741, 6 Cal. Rptr. 24, 29 (1960). It bears noting that the
court did not make retroactivity a constitutional mandate. It viewed retroactivity as a
problem turning on considerations of fairness and policy. This multiparous problem begets
many such considerations, and they may be just as much the concern of the legislature as
of the court. See also Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483,22 N.W.2d 528 (1963).
Cases may of course arise in which retroactivity is a constitutional mandate, as in the
new rules designed to preclude the risk of convicting the innocent. In such a case a
legislature would be bound by the retroactivity of the rule, as much as by the rule itself, as
the last word.
101. Lord Nottingham's Chancery Cases, 73 Selden Society 182 (1954). "But then in
Chancery when men act according to an opinion which hath long been current for law,
they are to be protected, although a latter resolution have controlled the former current
opinion, as in Magdalene College case, the resolution in the l1th report (11 Co. Rep. 66b)
being contrary to a received opinion which for a long time held the King not to be bound
by 13 Eliz., c. 10, the tenant who had laid out money in building upon that opinion was
protected in his lease against the resolution by Lord Ellesmere's decree, and the like case
was again decreed by the Lord Bacon C., between Long & Dean and Chapter of Bristol,
for which see 1 Rolle, 378, (S), 2 [Prolegomena, c.30, s 30]." Id
102. W. LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDIcTED, 16-17 (1967); Leach, Divorce by Plane
Ticket in the Affluent Society-With a Side-Order of Jurisprudence, 14 U. KANS. L. REV.
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I believe that it would be appropriate for the House of Lords to
resurrect this 1675 Chancery decision of Lord Nottingham and to am-
plify the 1966 Practice Statement by adopting the technique of
prospective overruling.10 3  Cautiously and skillfully used in
exceptional cases where retroactive overruling would be
demonstrably unjust, it would implement the purpose of the 1966
Statement to preclude injustice in a particular case and serve the
proper development of the law. Useful lessons and analogies could
be drawn from the now substantial experience with the technique in
the United States. Meanwhile, law reform resulting from
Parliamentary adoption of proposals of the Law Commissions of
England and of Scotland and the various Royal Commissions would
not only implement the prospective overruling technique, but also
serve to reduce the number of occasions where it would be necessary
to invoke it.
If the House of Lords undertakes the humble task of eradicating
weeds from a splendid garden of law, it will do honor to a profession
as noble as the painstaking gardeners who tend this beautiful land.
549,558 (1967).
103. See Friedmann, Limits of Judicial Lawmaking And Prospective Overruling, 29
MODERN L. REV. 593, 605 (1966). That author states, "It is unlikely that English courts-
still much more strongly wedded than American courts to the Blackstonian doctrine-will
adopt, eo nomine, any theory of 'prospective overruling.' But the House of Lords, in one
of its recent major lawmaking decisions, found another way of doing virtually the same
thing. In Hedley Byrne, the House of Lords could have been content to dismiss the action
on the ground that the defendants had excluded any legal responsibility for their
statement. It chose instead to enunciate, in a series of elaborate opinions, a future
principle of responsibility for financial statements negligently made under circumstances
in which third parties can reasonably be expected to rely on them. The House of Lords
overruled Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. with respect to future situations. And while
it has been suggested that the entire series of judgments may be dismissed as obiter dicta,
this is unlikely. The decision thus operates as a 'prospective overruling."' Id. (citations
omitted). See also Stevens, Hedley Byrne v. Heller: Judicial Creativity and Doctrinal
Possibility, 27 MODERN L. REV. 121 (1964); Stevens, The Role of a Final Appeal Court in
a Democracy: The House of Lords Today, 28 MODERN L. REV. 509 (1965); Israel, Gideon
v. Wainwright. The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SUPREME Cr. REV. 211.
For other cases in which new rules were in effect applied prospectively only, see
Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] A.C. 1254 (rule that a count of murder
should stand alone would no longer be followed; new rule not applied to Connelly) Cassell
& Co. v. Broome [1972] 1 All E.R. 801 (affirmed judgment on exemplary damages based
on prior case, but set forth detailed rules "for the future"). Prospective operation of new
rules is also accomplished by characterizing them as "rules of practice." See Friedland,
Prospective And Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking, 24 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 170,185 (1974).
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